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The Tibet-Japan Relations in the Era of the 1911 
Revolution
── Tibetan Letters from the Aoki Bunkyō Archive──
KOBAYASHI Ryosuke
Abstract：It is fairly well known that Japanese Buddhist monks approached the 13th 
Dalai Lama and members of his administration at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Recent studies have clariﬁed how these monks played a signiﬁcant intermediary role 
between Tibet and Japan, and that Japan was an important actor in competition over 
Tibet in the international arena while Britain and Russia played out their “Great 
Game.” However, Tibet’s policy towards Japan in this period and how Tibet placed 
Japan within its entire diplomatic sphere have been less studied. This article analyzes 
the relationship between Tibet and Japan at the beginning of the 20th century by mainly 
focusing on valuable Tibetan letters housed in the Aoki Bunkyō Archive at the National 
Museum of Ethnology in Ōsaka. These letters, composed around the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty, reveal that the 13th Dalai Lama and his attendants tried to seek the aid 
from the Japanese government to secure Tibet’s “rang btsan,” which is translated as 
“independence” in the contemporary Tibetan language. I also elucidate how the 
Japanese government refused to support Tibet due to its policy towards China amid the 
1911 revolution as well as the Japanese alliance with Britain, while Tibet’s relationship 
with China deteriorated. Moreover, by comparing the letters to Japan with the letters to 
other countries such as Britain and Russia, I will show that Tibet recognized Japan as a 
potential country that could protect them while facing the difﬁculty to enlist the aid 
under the restriction of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907.
關鍵詞：十三世達賴喇嘛，本願寺，辛亥革命，寺本婉雅，青木文教




　　After the Xinhai Revolution （辛亥革命） in 1911, as well as the establishment 
of the Republic of China in 1912, Tibet faced a difficult task in building its 
relationship with the new international order in East Asia. Recent research has 
clariﬁed that the 13th Dalai Lama （1876―1933） tried to gain support from the 
international community amid rising tensions with the Republic of China.1
　　The Dalai Lama, however, encountered significant difficulty gaining 
assistance from either Britain or Russia due to the Anglo-Russian Convention 
in 1907, which led to the end of the “Great Game,” a rivalry between Russia 
and Britain over Central Asia. This document declared that Britain and Russia 
recognized the “suzerainty” of China over Tibet.2 Therefore, Japan became 
increasingly important as a country from which the Dalai Lama hoped to 
obtain support when he took refuge in British India to escape from the Chinese 
army which advanced into Lhasa in February 1910.3
　　Recent research has significantly clarified how Buddhist monks from 
Japan, which had achieved rapid growth and had rivalries with China and 
Russia in East Asia since the late 19th century, visited Tibet and China and 
established close relationships with the Lhasa government and the 13th Dalai 
Lama.4 However, what has not been fully examined is the diplomatic policies 
of the Dalai Lama and his administration towards Japan.
　　In this article, I discuss Tibetan policies towards Japan at the beginning of 
the 20th century by focusing on original Tibetan letters that are housed in the 
1  The Dalai Lama tried to establish relationships or strengthen ties with many countries, including Britain, 
Russia, Mongolia, and the US around the time of the 1911 revolution （Jampa Samten & Tsyrempilov 2012; 
Knaus 2012; Kobayashi 2016a）.
2  Bell （1924: 289―291）; Lamb （1966: 108―109）; Shaumian （2000: 136―140）.
3  In my previous article focusing on the relationship between Tibet and Britain in 1913, I brieﬂy mentioned 
the Dalai Lama’s approach to Japan during this period （Kobayashi 2016a: 301―302）. I will expand this 
argument in the following sections; therefore, those sections partly overlap with the previous article.
4  Hyer （1960）, Hyer （2003）, Berry （1995） are important works based on the English and Japanese 
materials. Recent studies have made great strides in illuminating Japanese involvement in Tibetan issues 
during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century by using a wide range of valuable Japanese records. 秦（2005），
篠原（2009），高本（2012），高本（2013），白須（2011），白須（2012）．
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Aoki Bunkyō Archive at the National Museum of Ethnology in Ōsaka. These 
valuable letters were mainly sent from the Dalai Lama and his entourage to 
Aoki Bunkyō （青木文教，1886―1956）, a Japanese monk who was studying in 
Lhasa from 1913 to 1916, or delivered to Japanese dignitaries through Aoki 
Bunkyō himself.5 Based on an analysis of the Tibetan letters and comparing 
these letters with the letters that the 13th Dalai Lama sent to the other countries, 
I would like to explore how the Dalai Lama attempted to establish a 
relationship with Japan at that time, as well as what kind of role he expected 
Japan to play in supporting Tibet.
1． The 13th Dalai Lama’s First Exile and the Development 
of the Relationship with Japan
　　First, I would like to explain brieﬂy the historical background of the Tibet-
Japan relations by focusing on the 13th Dalai Lama’s ﬁrst exile in Mongolia and 
China from 1904 to 1909, and his encounter with Japanese dignitaries.
　　Following the advancement of the British Indian army into Lhasa in 1904, 
during which the British tried to establish direct communication with Tibet, the 
Dalai Lama ﬂed to Ikh Khuree in Mongolia to secure Russian assistance. The 
person who became an important intermediary between Tibet and Russia at 
that time was Agvan Dorzhiev, a Buryat-Mongolian assistant tutor of the Dalai 
Lama in debating practice who won the Dalai Lama’s trust （Snelling 1993, 
Kobayashi 2016a）. However, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904―1905 and 
Russian defeat of 1905 made it difficult for the Russian government to pay 
attention to Tibetan issues at that time. Due to losing a beneﬁcial diplomatic 
relationship with Russia, the Dalai Lama started searching for another country 
that could support Tibet, and Japan began to emerge as such a country in the 
eyes of the 13th Dalai Lama. Japanese Buddhist monks would go on to play 
remarkable roles in establishing the relationship between the Dalai Lama and 
Japan.
5  Kōmoto Yasuko extensively used valuable Japanese materials in the Aoki Bunkyō Archive in her 
outstanding biography of Aoki Bunkyō, and she also attached Japanese translations of the Tibetan 
materials made by Tsumagari Shinichi. 高本（2013）.
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　　In the late 19th century, modern Buddhist studies, as which was developed 
in Europe, received increasing attention within the Japanese Buddhist circles.6 
By absorbing the findings of modern Buddhist studies, many Japanese 
Buddhists became interested in rare Buddhist canons in Tibet and in studying 
Tibetan Buddhism as a special esoteric Buddhism. The Hongan-ji temple, 
which is afﬁliated with Jōdo Shinshū （淨土眞宗）, the largest Buddhist sect in 
Japan, was deeply involved in the movement to approach Tibet to obtain 
Tibetan Buddhist canons.
　　Teramoto Enga （寺本婉雅，1872―1940）, a Japanese monk from the Higashi 
Hongan-ji Temple （東本願寺）, the mother temple of Shinshū Ōtani-ha （眞宗大
谷派）, one of the two dominant branches of Jōdo Shinshū, had extensive experience 
with Tibetan affairs on a practical level at the beginning of the 20th century due 
to his role as an intermediary in the relationship between Tibet and Japan.7 
Teramoto ﬁrst learned Tibetan and Mongolian at Yonghegong （雍和宮）, the most 
prestigious Tibetan Buddhist Temple in Beijing in 1898. Immediately after the 
Boxer Rebellion （1899―1901） broke out, Teramoto, who served as an 
interpreter for the Japanese Army stationed in Beijing, purchased the Tibetan 
Kangyur from the Yellow Temple （Huangsi, 黄 寺） as well as both the Tibetan 
Kangyur and Tengyur from Zifuyuan Temple （資福院） in Beijing in December 
1900 （寺 本 1974: 299―301）. He also invited Akya Hutuktu （1871-1909）, who 
was the reincarnation of the father of Tsongkhapa（1357―1419） and the Abbot 
of Yonghegong to Japan from July to August 1901.8 Teramoto visited Lhasa 
through Amdo in 1905 and returned to Japan through India. After his brief stay 
in Japan, he left in 1906 for Amdo again, and studied in Kumbum Monastery. 
Teramoto was granted an audience with the 13th Dalai Lama, who took refuge 
6  More information about the development of modern Buddhist studies in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, 
see 下田（2006: 199―207）
7  The most up-to-date research of Teramoto’s engagement in Tibet issues is 篠原（2009）, 奥山（2011）, 白
須（2012）. Furthermore, Miyake Shinichirō and Kōmoto Yasuko recently have been conducting 
remarkable research on Teramoto’s original diary and records that previous research has not examined. 三
宅（2008）, 高本（2014）. It sheds new light on Teramoto’s life as a devout Buddhist, urging people to 
rethink researchers’ typical description of him as a “politically minded” person （Hyer 2003: 72）.
8  Kōmoto 2011. Successive reincarnations of Akya Hutuktu were appointed as high-ranking positions in the 
hierarchy of Tibetan Buddhist monks in Dolon Nor and Beijing by the Qing Court starting in the 18th 
century. 池尻（2013: 202―205）.
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in Amdo from the end of 1906, after realizing that it was difﬁcult for him to 
receive support from Russia. Teramoto quickly gained the trust of the Dalai 
Lama, and they met with each other a few dozen times there until the 
beginning of 1908 （Teramoto 1974: 248）.
　　Teramoto built a wide range of relationships within Japanese official 
circles in Beijing and Japan. On November 20, 1907, in his letters to Count 
Ōkuma Shigenobu （大隈重信）, who was a former prime minister in tentative 
retirement at that time, Teramoto insisted that Japan needed to encourage the 
Dalai Lama to move to Wutaishan （五臺山） and eventually to Beijing to build 
a cordial relationship with the Qing court.9
　　According to Teramoto’s letters to Ōkuma, the Tibetan Buddhist 
community had been divided into two groups: a “pro-Qing group” and a “pro-
Russia group.”10 In the Dalai Lama’s entourage, there were influential pro-
Russian ﬁgures such as Lamen Kenpo （Bla sman mkhan po bkras khang byams pa 
thub dbang, ?―1922）, who was the Dalai Lama’s doctor and close advisor,11 as 
well as Dorzhiev.
　　Teramoto thought that a Tibet-Russia rapprochement would cause Russian 
penetration into Qing territory, and that it might result in a security crisis for 
Japan.12 Alarmed by the Dalai Lama’s diplomatic approach towards Russia, 
Teramoto had the following discussion with the pro-Qing group:
The pro-Qing group ［under the Dalai Lama］ said, “It would be a great 
happiness if we are able to change the Dalai Lama’s mind, leaning towards 
Russia, into sharing his fate with the Royal family of Manchu, following 
Japanese advice.” I （Teramoto） replied, “The most convenient measure would 
9  Ōkuma Documnts（大隈文書）, イ―14―B0298―0001, Teramoto to Ōkuma, November 20th 1907.
10 Ōkuma Documnts,イ―14―B0298―0001, Teramoto to Ōkuma, November 20th 1907; イ―14―B0298―0002, 
Teramoto to Ōkuma, December 23rd. The political factions among Tibetan Buddhist monks, such as “Pro-
Qing” and “Pro-Russia,” are merely based on Teramoto’s own observations, and the actual situation 
within the Dalai Lama’s entourage will need further research.
11 Lamen Kenpo was an outstanding scholar who made contributions to the development of medicine in 
Tibet during the early 20th century, and served as a personal doctor to the Dalai Lama starting in 1897. He 
accompanied the Dalai Lama while this Tibetan leader was in exile in Mongolia, China, and India from 
1904 to 1912. Ko zhul grags pa ’byung gnas （1992: 111―113）
12 Ōkuma Documnts, イ―14―B0298―0001, Teramoto to Ōkuma, November 20th 1907.
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be that ［we urge the Dalai Lama］ to build his friendship with influential 
Japanese Buddhists, and provide ［him with］ a motive to break off the 
relationship with Russia, as well as have a close relationship with Japan and 
the Qing due to the harmonious religious relationship ［between Tibet, the 
Qing, and Japan］. It might contribute not only to the interests of the Qing, 
but also to the peace of East Asia （tōa no heiwa東亞の平和）.”13
　　Teramoto stood his ground, inﬂuenced by “Pan-Asianism,” and attempted 
to achieve an alliance between “Buddhist countries” in Asia̶such as Japan, 
China, and Tibet̶against the Russian Empire, and called this policy Soro 
Shinshin 疎露親清 （alienating Tibet from Russia, and allying it with the Qing）.14 
Teramoto also asserted that this policy would be able to contribute to the 
interest of Japan which had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, 
recognizing Russia as the common threat in East Asia.
　　In February 1908, the Dalai Lama decided to move from Amdo to Wutai 
Shan. Teramoto met the Dalai Lama two times at Wutai Shan. He asserted that 
the Dalai Lama should establish a relationship with Japan, and even invited 
him to Japan （寺本 1974: 268）. During the second audience on August 8 th, he 
arranged a formal meeting between the Dalai Lama and Ōtani Son’yu （大谷尊
由） who represented his elder brother Ōtani Kōzui （大谷光瑞，1876―1948）, the 
22nd Abbot of Nishi Hongan-ji Temple （西本願寺）.15 They discussed exchanging 
“students” or monks between Tibet and Japan （白須 2012: 37―38）.Then, after 
the Dalai Lama moved to Beijing, Teramoto played a significant role in 
mediating between the Dalai Lama and Japanese diplomats such as Ijūin 
Hikokichi （伊集院彦吉）, the Japanese Minister in Beijing. Since the Dalai Lama 
13 Ōkuma Documnts, イ―14―B0298―0002, Teramoto to Ōkuma, December 23rd, 1907.
14 Ibid. Teramoto’s idea of the uniﬁcation of Buddhist countries in Asia including Tibet against Russia is also 
stated in his record “ 西 藏 秘 密 国 の 事 情 ” ［The affairs of Tibet, the Secret Kingdom］. Kōmoto 
extrapolated the year of “publication” around 1929 （高本 2011: n 31）.
15 The 13th Dalai Lama’s biography brieﬂy records that “a high-ranking Japanese Lama （rephing bla ma che 
ba）” had an audience with the Dalai Lama at Wutaishan in the fourth month of the earth-monkey year. 
According to the time period, most likely it refers to Teramoto’s ﬁrst audience with the Dalai Lama at 
Wutaishan on June 2 nd, but it is possible that “high-ranking Japanese Lama” might indicate Ōtani Son’yu 
despite the fact that his actual meeting date was much later. Thub bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan 
’dzin., kha, 46a.
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was under the surveillance of Qing ofﬁcials, it is difﬁcult to suppose that the 
Dalai Lama was able to raise political issues in his meetings with the Japanese 
dignitaries at the Yellow Temple, the Dalai Lama’s residence.16 However, the 
Dalai Lama’s attendants, such as Dorzhiev and Lamen Kenpo, discussed the 
future relationship between Tibet and Japan with the Japanese officials and 
Teramoto （寺本 1974: 291）. Thus, the Tibet-Japan relationship rapidly developed, 
and the Dalai Lama and Japanese diplomats mutually promoted political and 
cultural exchanges in 1908.
　　In this period, the Dalai Lama became increasingly mistrustful of the Qing 
court due to its “New Policies” （新 政）, which were initiated by the Qing in 
order to transform the empire into a modern nation. Already in the summer of 
1907, It seemed that the Dalai Lama had noticed that Qing ofﬁcials had started 
discussing the establishment of a new “province” in Tibet in order to put Tibet 
under the direct control of the Qing,17 and he had growing anxieties that this 
policy might undermine his authority in Tibet.18 Accordingly, the discrepancies 
between the Qing and the Dalai Lama steadily increased due to the Qing’s 
radical reforms regarding Tibet.
2．The Second Exile of the 13th Dalai Lama and Aoki Bunkyō
2.1　The “Student Exchange” between Tibet and Japan
　　In February 1910, a few months after the Dalai Lama’s return from 
Beijing to Lhasa through Amdo, the Chinese army, which the Qing 
16 The Qing court gave an ofﬁcial notice on October 9 th to each foreign legation through the Foreign Ofﬁce 
（Waiwubu 外務部）, which required any foreign representatives with whom he might wish to meet to be 
accompanied by Chinese officials （WRAP, 91, Rockhill to Theodore Roosevelt, November 8, 1908）. 
According to the Qing’s record concerning the meeting between the Dalai Lama and Ijūin, Ijūin 
mentioned his future expectation that the Dalai Lama would accept Japanese students to study Buddhism 
in Tibet, and the Dalai Lama brieﬂy said “I will consider and deal with it when the time comes”. 外務部
檔案 02―16―007―02―074, December 14, 1908.
17 According to Teramoto, the Dalai Lama had received news that the Qing was planning to establish a new 
“viceroy” in Tibet. Ōkuma Documents, イ―14―B0298-0001, Teramoto to Ōkuma, November 20, 1907. It 
is probably a reference to discussions inside the Qing government, regarding the establishment of a new 
province in Tibet. Cen Chunxuan （岑春煊）, the Viceroy of Liangguang, proposed this policy on May 13, 
1907 （四川省民族研究所1989：921―926）.
18 Ibid.; WRAP: 91, Rockhill to Theodore Roosevelt, November 8, 1908.
108
Government dispatched in order to strengthen its control in Tibet, marched to 
Lhasa from Chengdu, Sichuan Province. The Dalai Lama and his entourage 
took flight to Darjeeling in India and were living in exile there with the 
permission of the British Indian authorities from February 1910 to the summer 
of 1912.
　　At this time, the Japanese government was collecting information on 
Tibetan issues, particularly after the 13th Dalai Lama went into exile, through 
its own diplomatic network in China and India as well as through its 
relationship with the British government.19 The main actor actively engaged in 
contacting the Dalai Lama, however, was the Nishi Hongan-ji Temple. Based 
on the agreement in Beijing in 1908 about the mutual exchange of students 
between Japan and Tibet, Ōtani Kōzui sent his disciples, Aoki Bunkyō and 
Tada Tōkan （多田等觀，1890―1967）, to Lhasa via India. Aoki ﬁrst met the Dalai 
Lama in March 1910 in India to give him a letter from Ōtani Kōzui, right after 
the Dalai Lama took refuge there, and developed a close relationship with the 
Dalai Lama before his long-term stay in Lhasa from the beginning of 1913 to 
the beginning of 1916 （白須 2012: 104―107, 高本 2013: 58―131）. Tada followed 
suit in 1912 and studied at Sera Monastery in Lhasa from around the end of 
1913 to the beginning of 1923 （高本 2012: 70―97）.
　　On the Tibetan side, the 13th Dalai Lama dispatched Tsha ba sprul sku 
ngag dbang blo bzang （1880―1957）, otherwise known as Tsawa Tritul in Japan, 
and his two attendants to Japan in 1911, and Aoki temporarily returned to 
Japan together with Tsawa Tritul. In Japanese materials, he was often referred 
to as an “Foreign Student （ryū gaku sei 留學生）” from Tibet （青木 1920: 12）. 
Just as the title implies, he studied Japanese in Kōbe during his short-term stay 
in Japan until January 1912, and Tada chaperoned him while learning the 
Tibetan language. （多田 2009: 18―19）
　　However, Tsawa Tritul was not just a mere “Student.” He, in fact, was a 
distinguished priest who received the highest scholarly degree, Geshe 
Lharampa, at the age of 21, after he completed his prestigious Buddhist 
19 FO535/13, 6337, Memorandum communicated to the Russian and Japanese Ambassadors, February 24, 
1910.
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education at Sera Monastery in Lhasa （Ko zhul grags pa ’byung gnas, 1992: 1375―
1376）. He gained the confidence of the Dalai Lama and accompanied the 
Tibetan leader to Ikh Khuree, Mongolia, in 1904. According to Tada Tōkan’s 
memoirs, it seems that Tsawa Tritul was expected not only to study the 
Japanese language, but also to carry out missions personally entrusted to him 
by the Dalai Lama as an envoy diplomat of Tibet （多田 2009: 19）.
　　It is noteworthy that, after Tsawa Tritul was sent to Japan, in the following 
couple of years, the Dalai Lama dispatched Dorzhiev to Mongolia and Russia 
and also sent Lungshar Dorje Tsegyal（Lung-shar rdo-rje tshe-rgyal）, a Tibetan 
aristocrat who won the Dalai Lama’s trust, to Britain. Lungshar, along with his 
diplomatic duties, acted as a chaperone to the Tibetan students who were sent 
for education in London, as one of the modernization projects that the Dalai 
Lama initiated in this period. Dorzhiev and Lungshar communicated with the 
governments of these countries regarding Tibetan issues （Kobayashi 2016a）. 
These delegations showcase the Dalai Lama’s diplomatic efforts towards 
establishing relations with foreign countries around the time of the collapse of 
the Qing Dynasty.
2.2　The Tibetan Letters to Japan from the Aoki Bukyō Archive
　　The Xinhai Revolution in October 1911 and the following collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty in February 1912 allowed the 13th Dalai Lama to seek a chance 
to expel the Chinese army from Lhasa and return there. During this period, by 
strengthening the relationship with the Hongan-ji Temple, as I argued in the 
previous section, the Dalai Lama’s trust in and expectation of Japan were 
growing as it was one of the countries that were not under restriction of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention （Kobayashi 2016b: 297―299）
　　We can understand the Dalai Lama’s policy towards Japan more clearly 
during his exile in India from 1910 to 1912 by examining the Tibetan 
documents in the Aoki Bunkyō Archive. I shall focus in particular on two letters 
from this collection that articulate Tibet’s political views and diplomatic 
relationship between Tibet and Japan, and I attached the transcriptions and my 
translation of these letters in the appendixes of this article.
　　First, Lamen Kempo sent a letter from Darjeeling to Aoki on the 
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seventeenth day of the eleventh month in the Iron-Pig Year （1911）, around the 
time when Aoki reached India as a reply to a letter from Aoki ［Appendix 1］.20 
It consists of one sheet of paper and is written in cursive writing, with no seal 
afﬁxed. Lamen Kempo said, “As for the postponement of dispatching an envoy 
to you, not only have Russia and Britain signed a treaty on the Tibet issue 
before, but also recently ［the Dalai Lama and the Chief Minister］ have been 
living in the British territory, and it could cause the British to be suspicious and 
cautious…” This letter indicates that the 13th Dalai Lama planned to send 
another envoy in addition to Tsawa Tritul, but he temporarily canceled it 
mainly due to his concern about the relationship with British India, which had 
concluded the Angle-Russian Convention in 1907. Since the Dalai Lama and 
his followers were in India under the protection of the British government, they 
had to make a careful decision on their relationship with the other foreign 
countries.
　　Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the letter clearly mentioned that Japan 
could be one of the important  countries able to support  Tibetan 
“independence.” It says “［if］ each strong country including you （Japan）, 
having conferred with each other, does not give up its concern for whatever 
good measures there are, as before, such that the independence （sger btsan）21 of 
religious and political power in Tibet comes about, allow ［us］ to repay the 
kindness ［of the countries］ later.” Lamen Kempo’s expectation that foreign 
powers would cooperate with each other to support the “independence” of 
Tibet is consistent with the contents of the Dalai Lama’s letters to Britain and 
Russia （Kobayashi 2016a）. In other words, Tibet not only attempted to build 
bilateral relationships with these countries, but also to form a multilateral 
coalition in the struggle against China.
20 According to this letter of Lamen Khenpo, Aoki offered some policy suggestions divided into several 
items to the Tibetan government, and these suggestions were circulated among the Dalai Lama and his 
entourage there. Aoki’s letter has not yet been discovered, and it requires further investigation.
21 Sger btsan was repeatedly seen in letters from Tibet to Russia in contexts similar to those of rang btsan 
（Jampa Samten & N. Tsyelemplov, 2012: 103―105, OF18617）. Rang btsan is always translated as 
“independence” in contemporary Tibetan language, and I also translated sger btsan as “independence” 
here. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the British ofﬁcials did not always interpret rang btsan as 
“independence” in ofﬁcial documents. 小林（2016a: 295―297）.
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　　In addition to this letter to Aoki, the Aoki Bunkyō Archive includes a letter 
written in 1913 by the 13th Dalai Lama to the Japanese Emperor via Aoki 
during the reign of Taishō Tennō （大正天皇［Emperor Taishō］，r.1912―1926）22, 
［Appendix 2］. It consists of one sheet of paper, is written in elegant 
handwriting, and the Dalai Lama’s seal （tā la’i bla ma’i tham ka rgyal） written in 
Pakpa script is afﬁxed.23
　　The stated addressee was “Nyi hong rgyal po chen po,” which can be 
literally translated as “Great King of Japan.” If we compare this title with titles 
which the Dalai Lama used in his letters to other countries, we will ﬁnd some 
differences. In the letter to King George Ⅴ in 1913, the Dalai Lama called him 
“Dbyin ci gong ma ^rgyal po chen po mchog” （The Great and Most Excellent 
Emperor）, as well as using “Gong ma rgyal po chen po” （The Excellent 
Emperor） to address the Russian Tsar Nikolas Ⅱ in his letter in 1912. Likewise, 
in the Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of 1913, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu （1869―
1924） was also referred to as “Gong ma chen po” （Great Emperor） in the 
Tibetan text of the treaty just as the Qing Emperors were called so in Tibetan 
materials.24 It is still unclear if the Dalai Lama systematically changed his 
manner of referring to the monarchs of the countries based on whether he used 
“gong ma,” which only was applied to supreme ﬁgures, or “rgyal po,” which 
was used to refer to a wider range of monarchs in Tibetan materials. There is 
the possibility that the Dalai Lama recognized that the status of the Japanese 
Emperor was slightly lower than that of the above monarchs, but this issue 
remains unclear and requires further investigation.
22 The Aoki Bunkyō Archive, 49. This valuable Tibetan record, originally housed in the Library of the 
University of Tokyo together with the other materials of Aoki, was brieﬂy analyzed by Hyer （2003: n18）. 
After these materials were transferred to the National Museum of Ethnology and classiﬁed as the Aoki 
Bunkyō Archive, Kōmoto Yasuko included a digital image of the letter and the Japanese translation of it by 
Tsumagari Shinichi in her book （高本2013: 117, 128 n9）.
23 The Aoki Bunkyō Archive 48 is an envelope that contains the Tibetan letter to the Emperor. It says “［the 
original Tibetan letter］ lent by the Imperial Household Ofﬁce （宮内省御貸下）.” It might signify that the 
Dalai Lama’s letter was sent to the Imperial Household Ofﬁce once, and later “lent” or returned from the 
ofﬁce to Aoki. 高本（2013: 128 n9）.
24 The Dalai Lama was also named “Gong ma bdag po chen po” in the Tibetan text of this treaty, and it is 
most likely because the treaty states that Jebtsundamba and the Dalai Lama were of equal status. See the 
image of the original Tibetan text of the Tibet-Mongol treaty （Lungta 17, 2013）.
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　　The letter emphasizes that both Tibet and Japan are Buddhist countries, 
and expresses the Dalai Lama’s appreciation of the Emperor and Hongan-ji 
Temple for its contribution to Buddhism, as well as his hope for friendship. 
This description of Japan as a “Buddhist” country indicates that the Dalai 
Lama developed his image of Japan through his interaction with the Hongan-ji 
monks, as well as through information about Japan provided by them. On the 
other hand, however, we cannot overlook the fact that the Dalai Lama’s letter 
was not a response to the “Pan-Asianism” that Teramoto embraced. As far as I 
know, there are no Tibetan materials suggesting that the Dalai Lama sought a 
coalition of “Asian countries” and that he identiﬁed Tibet as a part of “Asia” 
or “East Asia.”25 The Dalai Lama recognized China as a primary threat to Tibet 
around the 1911 Revolution, and “Pan-Asianism,” which asserts uniﬁcation of 
East Asia against Western Powers, might contradict his interest.
　　Again, the Dalai Lama explained that Tibet was struggling with China in 
Eastern Tibet （Chamdo and Drayab） and asked Japan to exert its inﬂuence on 
China for the withdrawal of the Chinese army and to bring “independence” 
（rang btsan） to Tibet.26 When the Dalai Lama composed this letter, Tibet was 
about to participate in the conference in Simla, India to negotiate with China 
by accepting the mediation of the British. This letter also referred to the Tibetan 
delegation, mentioning that Shatra Penjor Dorje was the plenipotentiary. While 
the Tibetan army was attempting to expel the Sichuan army from Lhasa in 
1912, the Chinese military launched another campaign towards Eastern Tibet 
from Chengdu in the summer of 1912, an imminent threat to the Lhasa 
government, and the border dispute there eventually became the most 
controversial question in the Simla Conference of 1913―1914. Even though he 
does not fully make a detailed request in his letter, the Dalai Lama might have 
expected to gain Japan’s diplomatic or even possibly military pressure on 
China to defend Eastern Tibet and Lhasa from the Chinese military advances as 
25 When and how the Tibetan people started realizing the concept of “Asia” and recognizing Tibet as one of 
the countries or regions of it needs further study. The infiltration of “Asia” as a geographical or a 
geopolitical notion among Japanese intellectuals since the 18th century are concisely examined by 
Yamamuro Shinichi （山室 2001: 31―53, 580―593）.
26 Aoki translated this “rang btsan” into自主獨立 （Jishu Dokuritsu） in Japanese, which means “independence.” 
Aoki Bunkyō Archive, 16.
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I will argue in the next section.
2.3　The Japanese Reaction to the Letters
　　The Dalai Lama’s effort to enlist Japan’s support for Tibet was, ultimately, 
not successful in this period. Even though I have not discovered any replies 
from Japan to the above two Tibetan letters of Lamen Kenpo and the Dalai 
Lama, the following Japanese materials indicate that the Japanese government 
did not have intention to fulﬁll the Dalai Lama’s requests.
　　After the 1911 Revolution broke out, the Japanese government received 
the letter and the statue of Buddha, which had been housed in the Potala 
Palace, from the Dalai Lama to Meiji Tennō （明治天皇［Emperor Meiji］） in 
April 1912 through Shibata Yōjirō （柴田要治郞）, the acting General Consul in 
Calcutta. Uchida Yasuya （内田康哉）, the Japanese Foreign Minister, however, 
declined to present them to the Emperor, most likely because he was concerned 
that the acceptance of the letter and gifts from the Dalai Lama would conﬂict 
with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed in 1905 and re-extended in 1911, 
which obliged Japan to defend British India if it faced a security threat.27
　　In addition to this, according to Shibata’s report to Uchida, Shibata 
received a visit from a Tibetan envoy on May 12, 1912, called “Niijan （ニイ
ジャン）,” who was “a merchant ofﬁcially in service to the government” （goyō 
shōnin 御用商人）, “managing the government’s ﬁnancial issues and providing 
advice to the government on important state affairs.”28 I am certain that he was 
Panda Nyima Gyeltsen （Spang mda’ nyi ma rgyal mtshan）, an influential 
merchant from the Kham region.29 He escorted the Dalai Lama with his armed 
subordinates when the Tibetan leader went into exile in Darjeeling.30 In his 
27 On the second and third Anglo-Japanese Alliance, see 寺本（1999: 53―115, 499―526） and 千葉（2008: 
159―163, 219―227）. Shirasu carefully examined the Japanese and English translated versions of the letter 
and pointed out the possibility that the original Tibetan documents were still housed in the Foreign 
Ministry; it requires further exploration（白須 2011: 363―364）. However, this does not mean there is no 
correspondence between the Dalai Lama and the Imperial Household in Japan. According to Aoki’s 
account, when the Emperor Meiji passed away, the Dalai Lama sent a telegram of condolence to the 
Imperial Household via Ōtani Kōzui on August 7, 1912, and the Imperial Household also sent back 
correspondence to the Dalai Lama through Hongan-ji Temple. 青木（1920: 22, 31―32）.
28 外務省記録，Series 1, Category 4, Section 1, Full set of documents on the negotiation between Britain 
and the Qing about Tibet, Vol. 1, May 14th, 1912, Shibata to Uchida.
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meeting with Shibata, he said that Tibet had decided to declare “independence,” 
but it was seriously concerned about retaliation from China. He asked Shibata 
if Japan could put Tibet under its protectorate and sell arms to Tibet through 
Manchuria and Mongolia. He emphasized that Tibet was desperately lacking 
weapons against the Chinese advancement towards Tibet and also complained 
that Britain and Russia could not support the Tibetan military because of the 
restriction imposed by the agreement between the two governments.
　　Shibata expressed his concern that making Tibet a protected state under 
Japan might contradict Japan’s non-intervention policy towards the revolution 
in China, as well as its alliance with Britain; likewise, providing arms and 
ammunition also could violate the neutral position of Japan, even though 
Shibata did not deny the potential that “private companies” might commit to 
an arms trade with Tibet31. Uchida, on May 17th, declined the requests from 
Nyima Gyeltsen in the confidential documents to Ijūin, the Minister in 
Beijing.32 The Japanese government’s foreign policy approach towards China 
during the 1911 revolution was cooperation with other powers such as Britain 
and Russia,33 and so it was very difficult for the Japanese government to 
provide Tibet with diplomatic and military support without recognition from 
these neighboring powers.
Conclusion
　　At the beginning of the 20th century, newly-emerging Tibetan specialists in 
29 Carole McGranahan concisely explains the growth of the Pandatsang family （Spa mda’ tshang）, the 
Tibetan merchant’s family in Kham, including Nyima Gyaltsen. McGranahan （2002: 105―112）.
30 Foreign Department, Secret-External, Proceedings, June 1910 Nos. 276―550, Part A, No. 480, Achoons 
Sering, Trafﬁc Mohurir to W.M. Crawford, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Feburary 25, 1910.
31 外務省記録，Series 1, Category 4, Section 1, Full set of documents on the negotiation between Britain 
and the Qing about Tibet, Vol. 1, May 14, 1912, Shibata to Uchida.
32 外務省記録，Series 1, Category 4, Section 1, Full set of documents on the negotiation between Britain 
and the Qing about Tibet, Vol. 1, May 17, 1912, Uchida to Ijūin.
33 Among policy-makers in the Japanese government, this policy was almost identical to that toward other 
regions apart from Tibet, including Manchuria, in which Japan had a vital interest. The Office of the 
General Staff of the Army（rikugun sanbō honbu 陸軍参謀本部） was once planning to put “Manchuria 
and Mongolia” under the protectorate of Japan, but it was not approved by the government. 中見（2013: 
113―124）. 
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Japan, such as Teramoto Enga and Aoki Bunkyō, played a signiﬁcant role in 
mediating between Tibet and Japan, by establishing relationships with the 13th 
Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama developed his understanding of Japan as a 
“Buddhist” country mainly through his contacts with these Hongan-ji temple 
monks. Moreover, due to the restrictions of the Anglo-Russian Convention, 
Japan became one of the potential countries that the Dalai Lama hoped to gain 
support from, in order to confront the Chinese military encroachment.
　　The Dalai Lama eventually failed to obtain aid from the Japanese 
government in the era of the 1911 revolution. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
Tibet’s relationship with Japan during this period will offer new insight into 
how the Dalai Lama developed his diplomacy towards foreign countries. He 
dispatched ﬁtting envoys according to the speciﬁcities of each country: monks 
such as Tsawa Tritul and Dorzhiev to the countries of Japan, Mongolia, and 
Russia, which the Dalai Lama perceived as supporting Buddhism; as well as 
the secular aristocrat, Lungshar, to Britain, in hopes of developing future 
modernization projects for Tibet. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama’s letters to 
Japan, Britain, and Russia indicate that he not only attempted to establish 
bilateral relationships with these countries, but also tried to form a multilateral 
coalition to implement effective pressure on China and to assist Tibet. All of 
these policies constituted important components of the Dalai Lama’s entire 
strategy to participate in the international community around the time of the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty.
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Appendix 1
Lamen Kempo’s letter to Aoki Bunkyo
（Aoki Bunkyō Archive, No. 23）
mkhyen brtse’i spyan stong bkra ba phyag mdzad mi si sar ’a o kyi rin po cher 
/ stabs ’bul / sngon du de nas gsung bris don mtshan zhib ’khod gnang ’byor 
don gsal ^gong sa srid blon lhan rgyas su ^snyan sgron zhu ’os de ’phral zhus 
zin cing / sku nyid kyis rang cag nang bstan la rgya gcig bzung gi bod mi las 
lhag pa’i bstan srid skor ’phral yun bde skyid ’byung thabs ［d］gong［s］ bzhed 
rgya che gting gzab kyi ’char gzhis don mtshan rim gnang legs byus zol med 
dngos ’brel stabs ^gong blon rnams kyang thugs kyi dgyes pa che cher bltas 
shing / kho bo yang dga’ gus spro gsum gyi gnas su ’gyur / phyogs der mi drag 
ched rdzong brkyang rgyu bod don skor de snga ru dbyin ching［s］ yig sngon 
bzhag khar/ deng skabs dbyin ji’i khongs bzhugs mus la dbyin ji dwogs ’drogs 
yong gzhir gnas skabs mi drag mngags rdzong mdzad bder ma ’gyur cing / ’on 
kyang de ga sogs rgyal khag che btsan khag nas ’phyar ba gru ’degs kyis don 
snying bod kyi bstan srid dbang byus sger btsan zhig rang yong ba’i thabs tshul 
legs byus ci mchis sngar bzhin thugs ’khur ’dor med nas / slar drin gso zhus 
’thus dang / de phyogs rigs gnas slobs spel du zho drung bsod nams ji phebs 
ltar gtong rtsis kyang / kho pa deng dus bsdad min la ring min ’byor rgyur de 
mtshams ched rdzong zhus chog pa ma zad / sku zhabs khrid sprul mchog la 
sngon chas（chad） kyang / nyid nas phan grogs gang zab nang gcig mi ltar 
gnang ’dug pa da dung yang gang cir phan ’gyur rogs ram mdzad ’os ci mchis 
dam don zhu rgyu bcas zab ’jags mkhyen mkhyen mkhyen / rten lha rdzas 
dbang gis mdangs ldan bcas rdor gling nang khang nas bla sman mkhan pos zla 
11 tshes 17 la ’bul /
Translation
Dear Mr. Aoki Rinpoche, trustee, who has 1,000 eyes of wisdom and 
compassion.
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　　Writing in brief. A letter, with items written in detail, arrived from your 
side the other day. It clearly mentions that it is right to report ［this letter to］ 
both the Dalai Lama and the Minister of State, and I did so immediately. We 
［Tibetans and Aoki］ share devotion to Buddhism, ［and on top of this,］ so that 
peace and happiness will be brought to religions and politics in the present and 
future, you revealed, one by one, the detail of a plan that ［you］ extensively and 
deeply considered more than the Tibetan people did. Since ［those］ great 
strategies ［which you suggested］ are sincere and true, I saw that everyone 
including the Dalai Lama and the Minister has become more and more pleased. 
I also came to have the three states of mind: love, respect, and happiness.
　　As for the postponement of dispatching an envoy to you, not only have 
Russia and Britain signed a treaty on the Tibet issue before, but also recently 
［the Dalai Lama and the Minister］ have been living in the British territory, and 
it could cause the British to be suspicious and cautious ［if we send the 
envoy］. ［Therefore］ it would be difficult to dispatch the envoy presently. 
However, ［if］ each strong country including you （Japan）, having conferred 
with each other, does not give up its concern for whatever good measures there 
are, as before, such that the “independence” of religious and political power in 
Tibet comes about, allow ［us］ to repay the kindness ［of the countries］ later.
　　［We］ plan to send Shodrung Sonam ［to Japan］ as soon as ［he］ reaches 
here for the sake of developing the study and education ［of Tibetan Buddhism 
in Japan］. He is absent now, but nevertheless expected here soon, so allow us 
to send him at that time. Moreover, you have given ［Lama］ Tritrul maximum 
support and treated him like family so far. Please keep in mind that I sincerely 
expect ［you］ will continue doing your best in terms of assistance which minds 
［his］ welfare in the future. ［Together with this］ Katag ［scarf］ that shines with 
power, Lamen Khenpo sends ［this letter］ from the place where attendants ［of 




The 13th Dalai Lama to the Japanese Emperor via Aoki Bunkyō
（Aoki Bunkyō Archive, No. 49）
bsod nams stobs kyi mngon mtho nyi hong rgyal po chen po mchog gi drung 
du / deng / rgyal po chen po bar der sku gzugs bde min dkon mchog gi thugs 
rjes da cha sing dwangs thub pa ngos kyang blo bder gyur / bod dang / nyi 
hong gnyis nang bstan gcig gyur la brten snga lo ’di ga’i slob ma sprul sku 
ngag dbang blo bzang po’o ’byo de phyogs bskyod skabs hong ’gan ji dang / 
rgyal po chen pos nang bstan lar rgyar dgongs pa’i rogs phan gang drag gnang 
’dug pa thugs rje che / deng skabs bod rgya lab rtsod skor rdo gling du dbyin 
bod rgya gsum gyi dpon rigs ’dzoms gtan stabs ’di nas srid ’dzin nang blon 
bshad sgra ba phebs rgyu yin rung / rgya phyogs nas bod sa dngos gnas khams 
chab brag khul dmag mi btang te khrims ’gal byed mus la rgya dmag phyir 
’then gyi bod ljongs rang btsan yong thabs ’phral phug bod don ’jog bzo legs 
thon ’byung ba’i rgya phyogs su shugs bskyed rogs mgon gang zab gnang lugs 
ma zad / mthun lam gsung bris phebs ’os yang yang yod pa zhu / rten kha btags 
dang / sangs rgyas kyi sku brnyan bcas ^tā la’i bla mas bod lugs chu glang zla 
5  tshes 22 la phul /  seal（tā la’i bla ma’i tham ka rgyal）
Translation
Dear His Majesty the Great King of Japan who has the highest power of merit, 
［It seems that］ recently, the Great King was under the weather for a while, but 
it is comforting to me as well to know that currently you have completely 
gotten well thanks to the three jewels.
　　I express gratitude that, since both Tibet and Japan are Buddhist 
［countries］, a few years ago, when the “student” Trulku Lozang Pujo from our 
side （Tibet） visited your side （Japan）, Honganji Temple and the Great King ［in 
Japan］ assisted him as best as possible out of devotion to Buddhism.
　　Currently, as for the dispute between Tibet and China, because it was 
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decided that the representatives from the three, Tibet, China and Britain, would 
gather in Darjeeling, the Minister of State Shatra Penjor Dorje from our side 
plans to visit ［there］. However, China sent an army to Chamdo and Drayap in 
Kham region where our territory truly is, and continues to commit illegal 
actions （illegal occupation）. If it pleases you, you might support ［Tibet］ by 
［having Japan］ exert pressure on China as best as it can, such that “independence” 
will be brought to Tibet through the evacuation of the Chinese army, and such 
that a good outcome will be obtained for Tibetan affairs in the present and 
future. ［As such, we are］ looking forward to continuously receiving letters of 
［our］ friendship.
　　［I send this letter］ together with presents such as ［this］ Katag ［scarf］ 
and ［this］ statue of Buddha. The Dalai Lama sent ［this letter］ on the 22nd of 
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